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OBLIGATIONS OF SHIPOWNERS
City of Winston,2 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court 'held "that the
election by the board of aldermen of one of its own members as "Street
Boss," an office with pay, at a meeting in which he was present and par-
ticipating, was against public policy.2" In Kendall v: Stafford,29 the court
refused to allow members of the county commissioners to raise their own
salaries for reason of interest. The court said that the fixing of salaries
should be left to popular vote.
The power of Congress to set up price control, parity and marketing
programs in the area of wheat production is clear. Similarly, it is for
Congress and the Department of Agriculture to establish the most efficient
and workable administrative hierarchy and procedural rules to deter-
mine the individual rights of program members. Within this broad scope
of Congressional power there exist certain limits, one created by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Certainly a farmer is entitled to
a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity determining adjudicative facts that will establish the farmer's
share of the community or county allotment. In the context of -the Garvey
decision, it is at least arguable that the degree of interest held by the
committee members should be grounds for disqualification under general
administrative law concepts. The entire situation appears to be one in
which, by the mere process of elimination in determining the normal yield
of each individual farmer in the community, each member of the com-
mittee will in fact determine "his own cause."
DONALD W. STEPHENS
Admiralty-Obligations of Shipowners to Stevedore Contractors for
Injuries to Longshoremen
If any boatman or young man of the beach shall undertake to
load or unload any ship or vessel by the job or for a lump sum, they
are bound to load and unload her well and diligently, and as quickly
as they can.... And if... the boatman or young man abovesaid have
to incur any expense or sustain any loss, the said merchants or the
managing owner of the ship or vessel for the merchants is bound to
" 126 N.C. 374, 35 S.E. 610 (1900).
"8 For a similar case, see State v. Thompson, 193 Tenn. 395, 246 S.W.2d 59
(1952).
" 178 N.C. 461, 101 S.E. 15 (1919).
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reimburse and to pay all that expense or loss or damage, which they
shall have sustained through their fault.
-Medieval Spanish Sea Code'
The above quoted portion from Les Costumes do la Mar is remark-
ably current in its approach to the theoretical legal relationship between
shipowners and those persons charged with the loading and unloading
of their ships. In those more simplistic times, however, there were no
stevedore contractors as we know them today. The modern longshoreman
is employed by the stevedore, who, in turn, negotiates directly with the
shipowner, and is placed in control of the ship until the work of load-
ing or unloading the cargo is completed. Injuries to longshoremen, when
they do occur, may be caused by some defect on board the ship for which
the shipowner may be liable, or injuries may be caused by conduct on the
part of the stevedore-employer. Since the longshoreman works on the
shipowner's vessel while it is under the control of the employing stevedore,
both the stevedore and the shipowner are potentially liable, and litigation
growing from such injury results in a confusing "multi-party Donny-
brook Fair."2 The law concerning the relative duties and liabilities of
the shipowner and stevedore is so complex because of this unique three-
sided litigation, that the simplistic formula of the medieval Spanish
mariners may have become a lost vision.
While on board the shipowner's vessel, and thence on navigable waters,
the longshoreman's relationship with his stevedore-employer is governed
by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.' The.
act is essentially a workmen's compensation statute designed to provide
relief for the longshoreman injured in the course of his employment, or
to provide payments to designated survivors in case of death. Compensa-
tion is paid irrespective of fault,4 and is exclusive, according to the statute,
as to the employing stevedore.5 The Longshoremen's Act does not, how-
ever, limit the rights of the longshoreman or his representative against
ILES COSTUMES DO LA MAR (THE CUSTOMS OF THE SEA) ch. cliv, as found in
THE BLACK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY, Append. III. This English translation is from
55 RERUm BRITANNICARUM MEDII 2EVI SCRIPTORES (CHRONICLES AND MEMORIALS
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES) 281 (1965).
'Proudfoot, "The Tar Baby": Martime Personal-Injury Indemnity Actions, 20
STAN. L. REv. 423 (1968).
3 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
4Id. § 904.
'Id. § 905. But the Court has refused to apply the exclusiveness provision when
the employer is the owner of the ship on which the long-shoreman is injured.
Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731 (1967).
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third persons, although acceptance of compensation by the longshoreman
subrogates the stevedore to his rights as against such third persons unless
the longshoreman or his representative brings an action within six months
after paymentf If the stevedore exercises his subrogated rights against
third persons and is successful, all recovery in excess of the amount that
the stevedore has paid to the longshoreman is divided between the two,
with the longshoreman getting four-fifths.'
In addition to his statutory rights against the stevedore-employer, the
injured longshoreman has substantial opportunity for recovery from the
shipowner on whose ship he is performing his stevedoring duties. Not only
may suit be brought for injuries under maritime tort law, but since Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,8 the shipowner may be held liable for injuries to
the longshoreman under the maritime doctrine of "unseaworthiness," a
type of strict liability formerly applied only to seamen.
When a longshoreman suffers an injury, therefore, both the stevedore
and the shipowner may find themselves liable without being at fault-the
stevedore for compensation under the Longshoremen's Act, and the ship-
owner for damages under the strict liability doctrine of "unseaworthi-
ness." Problems arise after one of them has incurred such liability and
attempts to recoup from the other his payments to the longshoreman. As
was noted, payment of compensation under the Longshoremen's Act sub-
rogates the employing stevedore to the claims of the injured longshore-
man if the latter does not sue within six months of payment,1" thus allow-
ing the stevedore to proceed against the shipowner in those cases where
the latter might be liable to the longshoreman. But the Sieracki decision,
Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation
order filed by the deputy commissioner shall operate as an assignment to
the employer of all rights of the person entitled to compensation to recover
damages against such third person unless such person shall commence an
action against such third person within six months after such award.
33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1964).
' "The employer shall pay any excess to the person entitled to compensation
or to the representative, less one-fifth of such excess which shall belong to the
employer." Id. § 933(e) (2).
S328 U.S. 85 (1946).
'The concept of unseaworthiness as applied to seamen and longshoremen has
little to do with the vessel's ability to encounter the hazards of the sea. Rather, it
is viewed in terms of safety hazards to individuals working on board the ship.
See H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT 13-20 (1963); Com-
ment, Unseaworthiness, Operational Negligence, and the Death of the Longshore-
mens and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 550 (1968).
For an example of how "strict" the liability under "unseaworthiness" is, see
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
1033 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1964).
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while holding th shipowner liable to a longshoreman for injuries caused
by "unseaworthiness," provided no method by which the shipowner could
be compensated by the stevedore when the unseaworthy condition was
caused by the latter. Thus the stevedore was able to recoup his compensa-
tion payments to the longshoreman through the subrogation provisions
of the Longshoremen's Act"' even if the longshoreman's injuries resulted
from an unseaworthy condition that the employing stevedore had created;
and the shipowner had no way of preventing such an action, or of being
compensated by the stevedore who was at fault. "The absolute liability
of the shipowner for unseaworthiness and the fact that its vessel could
easily be rendered unseaworthy without its knowledge by the acts of a
land based contractor created a situation which cried out for relief."12
In addressing itself to this problem, the Supreme Court, after reject-
ing any tort theory of contribution, accepted the contention that when the
stevedore made the contract with the shipowner he impliedly warranted
that his services were to be carried out in a "workmanlike manner." Thus,
in the landmark decision of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp.,3 the Court found that a breach of this warranty would entitle the
shipowner to indemnity for his payments to an injured longshoreman.
The controlling standard of "workmanlike" was conveniently vague so
as to allow fluid application as each situation required, thereby leaving
to the judgment of the court the task of balancing the liabilities in a given
case. 4 It is important to note that negligence on the part of the ship-
owner will not bar his action for indemnity from the stevedore unless
the negligence is of such nature as to prevent the stevedore from carrying
out his implied warranty.'"
As a result of the Ryan decision, the shipowner now possesses an
independent right of action against the stevedore apart from the long-
shoreman's right to compensation from the stevedore, while the stevedore
possesses certain subrogated rights of the longshoreman against the ship-
owner. Damages for breach of the stevedore's warranty are measured by
1Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (f953) ; Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).12 H. BAER, supra note 9, at 183.
350 U.S. 124 (1956). For a thorough discussion of pre-Ryan decisions, see
Weinstock, The Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered
by Harbor Workers, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 321 (1954).
" See, e.g., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,
376 U.S. 315 (1964).
"
5See, e.g., Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959);
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Oper. Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
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the amount of damages paid to the longshoreman by the shipowner."8
However, there is no correlation between the compensation paid to the
longshoreman by the stevedore under the Longshoremen's Act and the
amount he seeks to recover under the subrogated claim against the ship-
owner.' 7 Since the longshoreman's recovery from the stevedore is mea-
sured by a wage-scaled compensation allotment,"8 it would seem that,
normally, the amount of recovery against the shipowner under the long-
shoreman's rights, if the shipowner was found liable, would exceed any
compensation liability incurred by the stevedore to, the longshoreman.
It was inevitable, however, that a situation would arise in which the
liability of the stevedore to the longshoreman would be greater than the
amount the stevedore could recover through his subrogated claim under
the Longshoremen's Act. In Burnshide Shipping Co. v. Federal Marine
Terminals, Inc. 9 a longshoreman, Gordon T. McNeill, was killed on board
a ship owned by Burnside. The potential statutory liability of Federal, the
employing stevedore, under the Longshoremen's Act amounted to an
approximated sum of $70,000.20 However, under the Illinois wrongful
death statute, which would govern the stevedore's subrogated claim under
the Longshoreman's Act,2 the maximum recovery for wrongful death
is $30,000.22 The administratrix of McNeill's estate brought a wrongful
death action against the shipowner who, in turn, sought indemnification
from the stevedore under the Ryan doctrine of breach of implied warranty
for workmanlike service. The stevedore company filed a counterclaim for
their potential liability of $70,000. In trying to avoid the statutory
wrongful death limit of $30,000 for its subrogated claim against the ship-
owner, the stevedore argued that there was a separate cause of action in
its favor against the shipowner apart from those subrogated rights under
the Longshoremen's Act of the employee's wrongful death claim. Holding
that the method provided under the Longshoremen's Act was the steve-
dore's exclusive remedy against the shipowner, the trial court dismissed
" See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 125
(1956).
27 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1964).1 Id. § 908-09.
10392 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1968), aff'g 284 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ill. 1967), cert.
granted, 393 U.S. 820 (1968).
"2 392 F.2d at 919.
" Absent statutory provisions, there is no maritime wrongful death action.
Since Congress has not provided for recovery for wrongful death that occurs within
the territorial limits of a state, the Supreme Court has supplemented the maritime
law with that state's wrongful death statute. H. BAER, spra note 9, at 99.
2" ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1967).
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the counterclaim. 23 The circuit court affirmed the district court's hold-
ing,24 and Federal, the employing stevedore, is seeking review before the
Supreme Court, where decision is presently pending.
The cases that may be correlated to those issues presented in Burnside
have, with few exceptions, agreed with the district court's holding.25
There is no direct authority for finding the shipowner separately liable to
the stevedore,26 but some cases have hinted that there may be occasions
when a separate contractual liability may flow directly from the shipowner
to the stevedore.
2 7
Actions in contract and tort offer the two possible approaches to the
independent liability concept. The tort theory presents the weaker base
for a cause of action separate from the statutory right of subrogation,
although it has had some recent support in admiralty circles. 21 One prob-
lem in the tort area is defining just what standard of duty is owed by the
shipowner to the stevedore, as contrasted with his duty to the longshore-
man. Despite allowing the longshoreman to avail himself of the doctrine
of unseaworthiness against the shipowner, strong case law has expressed
judicial unwillingness to extend the coverage of the doctrine past the
individual longshoreman.2 9 In addition, actions under a negligence theory
should fail because the duty owed by the shipowner to the stevedore, as
contrasted to the duty owed to the longshoreman, is too remote for legal
cognizance.3 ° It is understandable, therefore, that in Burnside the employ-
2 284 F. Supp. at 744-45.
='392 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1968).
2 See, e.g., Doleman v. Levine, 295 U.S. 221 (1935) (no cause of action for
part payment of compensation); United States v. Klein, 153 F.2d 55 (8th Cir.
1946) (statutory provisions for employer recovery of compensation paid under
Federal Employees' Compensation Act exclusive for employer as to third persons);
The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927); United States v. The S.S. Wash-
ington, 172 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Va. 1959); California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. United
States, 74 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Cal. 1947); McCormick v Zander Reum Co., 25
Ill. 2d 241, 184 N.E.2d 882 (1962). Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301 (1947).
2" Burnside Shipping Co. v. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc., 392 F.2d 918,
919 (7th Cir. 1968).
'Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
8 Proudfoot, supra note 2.
29See, e.g., Albina Engine & Mach. Works, Inc. v. Hershey Choc. Corp., 295
F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Intl, 170 F. Supp. 601
(S.D. Cal. 1959).
" Cf. Crab Orchard Improv. Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d 277, 282 (4th
Cir. 1940).
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ing stevedore limited its argument to the Supreme Court to an implied
contractual theory as grounds for a separate cause of action."'
The implied contractual warranty is not an unfamiliar concept in
admiralty. As was noted earlier by the excerpt from Les Costumes do la
Mar, even the medieval longshoreman was "bound to load and unload
[the ship] . . .well and diligently.. ,,." The Ryan decision found such
a duty owing as an implied warranty of "workmanlike" service ;'3 but the
duty is owned by the stevedore-employer, not by the individual long-
shoreman. If the court can find an implied warranty running in favor of
the shipowner against the stevedore, would it necessarily follow that it
should find such a warranty running in favor of the stevedore against the
shipowner?
The possibility of finding such an implied warranty in favor of the
stevedore has not been entirely discarded. One of the most in depth
considerations of the duties of the shipowner with respect to the steve-
dore was given in Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International.4 The
decision suggested that there was some minimal standard that the ship-
owner warranted to the stevedore, although in that case no breach was
found.
The surrounding circumstances of fact, and that of law ....
prompt the holding that, absent express provision to the contrary, the
shipowner owes to the stevedoring contractor under the stevedoring
contract the implied-in-fact obligations: (1) to exercise ordinary care
under the circumstances to place the ship .. . in such condition that
an expert and experienced stevedoring contractor . . .will be able
... to load or discharge the cargo . .. in a workmanlike manner and
with reasonable safety to persons and property; and (2) to give the
stevedoring contractor reasonable warning of the existence of any
latent or hidden danger . . .35
It will be remembered that negligence of the shipowner has not been held
a bar to his seeking indemnification from a stevedore for the latter's
breach of his implied warranty of workmanlike service.3" If the ship-
"Brief for Petitioner, Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping
Co., - U.S. - (1969).
" See note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
"Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
"' 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959), aff'd sub non., Metropolitan Stevedore Co.
v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803
(1960).
"170 F. Supp. at 610-11.
"See note 15, supra.
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owner is going to be allowed to collect indemnification despite his own
negligent conduct, it would not seem logical that such negligence could
conversely support an action by the stevedore.3 7 What the Hugev opinion
seems to imply is a doctrine akin to the tort "assumption of risk" theory.
A stevedore should expect that after a long voyage certain hazardous con-
ditions will exist on board the vessel.
Being a mass of plates, pipes, wires, beams and various mechanisms,
each to some degree vulnerable to the elements, it would be too much
to expect a cargo vessel to arrive in port with all equipment, appli-
ances and facilities in a fully seaworthy condition.38
While the shipowner impliedly covenants to exercise reasonable care to
furnish a safe ship, the stevedore accepts the risks that he obviously
expects to find on board.
Stevedoring contractors hold themselves out as being trained and
equipped to cope with these conditions and these dangers. To this
end, the stevedoring contractor is usually given full use and charge
of the ship's loading and unloading equipment and appliances and the
cargo hatches and holds. So it is that the stevedoring contractor can-
not reasonably expect, and does not expect, to board a vessel which in
all respects . . . is in a seaworthy condition, or even in a reasonably
safe condition.39
The "assumption of risk" concept conveniently compliments the decisions
holding that negligence on the part of the shipowner (short of that
which prevents the stevedore from fulfilling his implied warranty of
workmanlike service) will be no bar to the shipowner's indemnification
from the stevedore for the shipowner's liability to the injured longshore-
man. Such a solution also has the advantage of being "situational"; it
can be manipulated by the courts in much the same manner as the concept
of "workmanlike service" is applied in shipowner indemnity cases.40
A cause of action apart from the stevedore's subrogated rights under
the Longshoremen's Act could be found in such an implied obligation of
the shipowner to furnish a safe ship with the concomitant implied assump-
tion by the stevedore of risks produced by the predictable hazards to be
found on board. In practical application, the courts could weigh the
various factors that enter such a relationship, such as the length of the
"7 Cf. Proudfoot, supra note 2, at 444.
" 170 F. Supp. at 610.
a9 Id.
40 See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
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voyage, the type of cargo that is carried, the age of the vessel, the season,
and the climate of the port. Liability would be predicated not on what is
foreseeable by the shipowner, but on what is foreseeable in a given situa-
tion by the stevedore."
It might be questioned, however, whether such a finding of an implied
contractual obligation on the part of the shipowner to the stevedore would
disturb the equilibrium imposed on their relationship by the Ryan de-
cision. In the great majority of cases, an equitable result can be reached
by using the existing actions of the longshoreman under the subrogation
provisions of the Longshoremen's Act. Only in the few cases where the
problem as presented in Burnside arises would the theory of the steve-
dore's independent action be useful. It may be that the equitable result
possible in the instant case would not justify problems, such as the follow-
ing, that an implied contractual obligation on the shipowner would pre-
sent.
1. Does the stevedore's action under such an implied warranty bar
the longshoreman from bringing a subsequent action against the ship-
owner? If the independent action by the stevedore is found to be no bar
to the longshoreman's tort action, then the stevedore may recover for
his potential liability from the shipowner who will still be held liable to
the longshoreman, thus producing dangers of double recovery. If the
solution to that problem is to give the stevedore an action only for that
amount in excess of what the longshoreman may recover, it is tantamount
to admission that the action is not independent, but defined solely by the
rights of the longshoreman.
If, instead, such an independent action by the stevedore is held to bar
any future action by the longshoreman, then it must be conceded that the
rights on which the suit is brought are not those of the stevedore, but
actually those of the longshoreman. A method has already been provided
for such recovery under the subrogation provisions of the Longshore-
men's Act. Moreover, such a method of destroying the longshoreman's
cause of action against the shipowner may produce harsh results when
the stevedore fails in his independent action, especially since the long-
shoreman's consent need not be obtained for the stevedore's suit to be
brought initially if the action is truly independent.
2. Would a breach of the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike
service relieve the shipowner of his warranty to provide a reasonably safe
' Cf. Proudfoot, supra note 2, at 443-44.
1969]
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ship? Or, conversely, would a breach of the implied obligation on the
part of the shipowner justify a breach by the stevedore of his warranty?
Such questions might be answered by ascertaining who breached his
respective warranty first (a question of fact), or whether the initial breach
is material or not (a question of law) .42
3. If there will be more than one action (and with independent causes
of action, such a result is inevitable) what effect will the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel have on the second proceeding?
The answers to these problems are not easily found without in some
way disturbing settled rules of law; to find a separate cause of action in
favor of the stevedore could open a new "Pandora's box," causing more
problems than it cured. The Supreme Court, after witnessing the dis-
tressing result of its Sieracki decision, may tred with more caution in
Burnside. The fact that a method of recovery already exists within the
framework of the Longshoremen's Act should carry great weight. Its
provisions would be entirely adequate under normal circumstances.
THOMAs B. ANDERSON, JR.
Civil Procedure-Broadening the Use of Collateral Estoppel-
The Requirement of Mutuality of Parties
While driving Northland's car, Mackris collided with Murray and
was killed. Northland sued Murray for his negligence and recovered for
the damage to the car. Then Mrs. Mackris sued Murray for the wrong-
ful death of her husband, claiming that the judgment in Northland's favor
in the first action was conclusive of the issues of liability in the second.
The federal district court agreed and gave her summary judgment. In
Mackris v. Murray,1 the sixth circuit took a different view and reversed.
Although applying Michigan law, the court expressed a strong commit-
ment against such a broad application of res judicata.2
"I For a brief consideration of this problem, see id. at 444.
1397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968).
2 The federal court considered itself at liberty to construct a possible state court
decision. The leading case, Clark v. Naufel, 238 Mich. 249, 43 N.W.2d 839 (1950),
refused to allow the use of collateral estoppel defensively due to lack of mutuality of
parties. Other cases, such as De Polo v. Grieg, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441
(1954), admit that the modem rule is Bernhard v. Bank of America Natl Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), which permits the use of
collateral estoppel by a non-party in the first action, but decides the issue on differ-
